

MEMORANDUM FOR: *Ex Sec*

Per your request on Friday, 11/9
Copies of this were slotted
for DCI, [redacted]

[redacted] Per [redacted]
request, a copy was also
slotted for DDCI.

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A**URGENT**MESSAGE NO. 840 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 6FROM R. KIMMITT
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NSC MTG ON SOVIET
NONCOMPLIANCE (C)

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>BRAVO</u>	<u>CHARLES HILL</u>	<u>EXE. SEC.</u>	
<u>BRAVO</u>	<u>JACQUELINE TILMAN</u>	<u>USUN</u>	
<u>BRAVO</u>	<u>WILLIAM STAPLES</u>	<u>ACDA</u>	
<u>BRAVO</u>	<u>WILLIAM GRAHAM</u>	<u>ACDA</u>	
<u>BRAVO</u>	<u>AMB. ROWNY</u>	<u>STATE</u>	
<u>DELTA</u>	<u>JOHN STANFORD</u>	<u>OSD</u>	
<u>DELTA</u>	<u>GEORGE JOULWAN</u>	<u>JCS</u>	

REMARKS: FOR MTG MONDAY 9 JAN 84!

ALPHA THOMAS CORMACK CIA
INDIA WILLIAM VITALE DOE

B-223
XFC-134

SYSTEM II
90011SECRETNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
January 7, 1984

Executive Registry

84- 043

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security AffairsMr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of StateCol (P) John Stanford
Executive Secretary
Department of DefenseMr. William V. Vitale
Executive Secretary
Department of EnergyDr. Alton Keel
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and BudgetMr. Thomas B. Cormack
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence AgencyMs. Jacqueline Tillman
Executive Assistant to the
United States
Representative to the United
NationsBG George A. Joulwan
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of StaffMr. William B. Staples
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament AgencyAmbassador Edward Rowny
Chief Negotiator
Strategic Arms Reductions TalksDr. William Graham
Chairman, General Advisory
Committee
Arms Control and Disarmament AgencySUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements,
Monday, January 9, 1984 (C)Attached are an agenda and a discussion paper on Soviet noncompliance with
arms control agreements for use at the National Security Council meeting
to be held in the White House Cabinet Room on Monday, January 9, 1984,
at 1:30 p.m. (S)
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachments as Noted

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
ON
SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

January 9, 1984

AGENDA

- | | | |
|------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|
| I. | <u>Introduction</u> | - Mr. McFarlane |
| | Agenda Outline | |
| | Judgments on Soviet Actions | |
| II. | <u>Plan for Consultations and</u> | - Principals |
| | <u>Public Affairs</u> | |
| | Congress and Allies | |
| | Public Affairs | |
| III. | <u>US Responses to Soviet</u> | - Principals |
| | <u>Noncompliance</u> | |
| | Near-Term Decisions | |
| | Longer-Term Decisions | |
| IV. | <u>Conclusion</u> | - Mr. McFarlane |

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January 6, 1984

Decision Measures:**US Policy Responses
to Soviet Violations**

Listed below are measures which the US can adopt as policy responses to Soviet violations of arms control obligations and political commitments. Measures which can be implemented immediately involve four categories of possible actions: Improved Security, Improved Verification, Public Affairs, and Diplomacy. In addition, broad categories of longer-term policy options which would require further intensive study and for which decisions could be deferred for now are included. These longer-term options include the study of possible measures to enhance security and verification, and of possible changes in our arms control policy.

When examining these options, our compliance policy objectives should be kept in mind: 1) deter Soviet non-compliance, 2) convince the Soviets to halt any violations and give up any military advantages gained, 3) protect US security against the risks or consequences of Soviet violations, in a way that minimizes the risk of accelerating US-Soviet arms competition, 4) achieve domestic and Allied support for US compliance policy, 5) improve US capabilities to detect violations on a timely basis, 6) maintain the viability of existing arms control agreements which have security benefits for the US, to include correcting existing agreements if faulty, 7) induce the Soviets to continue negotiating arms control, leading to agreements which contain effective verification and compliance provisions.

I. Measures for Immediate Decision

These measures are immediate steps which could form the foundation of our policy responses to which other options could be added as the situation warrants. In implementing these immediate measures all agencies agree that in the near term the US will continue to observe the ABM Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), SALT Interim Restraint, and the TTBT, and that a review should be conducted of the net impact of continued US observance of affected arms control agreements. All agencies agree to continue study of possible additional instances of Soviet non-compliance.

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A. Improved Security.

1. Continue to factor potential Soviet non-compliance into our force modernization plans.
2. Continue to press vigorously for funding for the binary CW program.*

B. Improved Verification.

1. Continue to seek: improvements in the TTBT, strengthening of the BWC*, and negotiation of a CW ban*.
2. Re-evaluate the verifiability of current US arms control proposals, including cooperative procedures, in light of Soviet non-compliance.
3. Implement Red Team review panel to anticipate possible Soviet non-compliance.
4. Modestly enhance current and programmed intelligence capabilities, focusing primarily on enhancements to analysis, with relatively little budgetary impact. (Estimated to cost \$5-50 million.)

C. Public Affairs. A low-profile approach will be taken. This will primarily involve classified briefings for Congress and the Allies, a press backgrounder, and an unclassified fact sheet. In classified briefings with the Congress and the Allies, US-Soviet exchanges on compliance issues could be summarized.

D. Diplomacy. There are four avenues of diplomatic activity which could be implemented immediately. The first three of these options could be used to inform the Soviets of our conclusions regarding the issues, seek termination of violations, and where appropriate obtain Soviet agreement to take actions which would neutralize the consequences of violations. The measures stated below, if chosen, could be used separately or in combination.

* ACDA believes that this measure should be reviewed in light of the results of the compliance study and the need to develop appropriate responses.

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Possible Options:

1. Continue to press for resolution and clarification in the SCC. (This remains controversial among Agencies.)
2. Continue high-level diplomatic demarches and discussions with the Soviets.
3. A Presidential-level communication to the Soviet General Secretary which could:
 - a) highlight the compliance problem in a broader context, or
 - b) specifically request the USSR to cease or reverse violations. (This remains controversial among Agencies.)
4. Take the issue of Soviet CBW use to the UN Security Council. (Some agencies believe this option needs more study.)

II. Policy Alternatives for Further Study

In addition to measures which can be implemented immediately, there are also longer-term policy options. These options would either entail significant expenditures or major changes of policy. Hence, these options need to be studied in detail to determine their feasibility, cost-effectiveness, probability of acceptance by the Congress, and impact on the US position in current arms control negotiations.

A. Improved Security. The JCS have concluded that in the near term the strategic modernization program, if fully funded, is adequate to cope with the military implications of the unauthorized activities of the Soviet Union, with the exception of the CBW activities in violation of Soviet obligations. Therefore, with the exception of CBW, in the near term no additional military responses are required to redress an increased military risk to the U.S. resulting from Soviet non-compliance activities. However, this is predicated on the US continuing to take those essential military steps to maintain our deterrent, particularly since existing or future arms control agreements cannot alone guarantee Soviet compliance.

1. Study a variety of possible longer-term military countermeasures which could negate the benefits of specific areas of Soviet non-compliance.

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Example of Issues:

B. Enhanced Verification. The ability to verify compliance with arms control agreements is essential if our national security is to be enhanced through arms control.

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C. Arms Control Options. Arms control agreements which involve militarily significant reductions and effective verification, and which are complied with, can enhance our security by making deterrence stronger and more stable. We should not alter the basic US commitment to seeking effective arms control, but we must be realistic in our expectations about the contribution arms control can make to US national security. A key challenge is to develop new arms control regimes and strengthen existing ones so as to encourage compliance.

1. Assess the net benefit to the US of seeking improvements to agreements, and of continuing compliance with or not undercutting obligations and political commitments which the Soviets have violated.

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